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Abstract
Despite increasing prominence, little is known about the cognitive processes underlying shared decision making. To
investigate these processes, we conceptualize shared decision making as a form of distributed cognition. We introduce
a Decision Space Model to identify physical and social influences on decision making. Using field observations and
interviews, we demonstrate that patients and physicians in both acute and chronic care consider these influences
when identifying the need for a decision, searching for decision parameters, making actionable decisions Based on
the distribution of access to information and actions, we then identify four related patterns: physician dominated;
physician-defined, patient-made; patient-defined, physician-made; and patient-dominated decisions. Results suggests
that (a) decision making is necessarily distributed between physicians and patients, (b) differential access to information
and action over time requires participants to transform a distributed task into a shared decision, and (c) adverse
outcomes may result from failures to integrate physician and patient reasoning. Our analysis unifies disparate findings
in the medical decision-making literature and has implications for improving care and medical training.
Keywords
doctor–patient communication and relations; cognition; decision making; chronic disease; Multiple Sclerosis; emergency
care; qualitative; grounded theory; North America

Introduction
Health care research and policy increasingly emphasize
shared decision making (Hibbard & Greene, 2013; Thille
& Russell, 2010). However, research on shared decision
making is often limited to examining isolated choice points
and/or factors facilitating or hindering patient involvement, without addressing the decision-making process
itself (Bernabeo & Holmboe, 2013; Légaré & Witteman,
2013). This approach reflects a limited understanding of
the reasoning involved in shared decision making and of
the factors that shape the distribution of clinical cognition
among patients and health professionals.
As physical, organizational, and institutional work occur
along a clinical illness trajectory (Strauss, Fagerhaugh,
Suczek, & Wiener, 1995), so too clinical cognition is an
ongoing process that occurs throughout the duration of
care. Thus, a cognitive trajectory occurs in parallel with a
patient’s illness trajectory. Medical decisions occur precisely when the current trajectory needs to be altered,
prompting physicians and patients to share information and
coordinate action (Elwyn et al., 2014; Epstein, 2013). To
elaborate the ensuing, interrelated processes, we employ
the paradigm of distributed cognition.

Distributed cognition locates thought as an emergent
property of people interacting with other actors and the
environment rather than a process inherently restricted to
individual minds. This paradigm motivates the analysis of
decision making as a social, physical, and cognitive process
that integrates multiple actors’ perspectives (Cowley &
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Hutchins, 1995). Researchers
have examined distributed cognition among medical practitioners (Engeström, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 2003; Feufel,
Robinson, & Shalin, 2011; Hazlehurst, McMullen, &
Gorman, 2007). However, to date, little is known about
how patients and health professionals engage in distributing
clinical cognition (Lippa & Shalin, 2015).
To illuminate how this distributed cognitive system influences medical decision making, we first review established
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approaches to understanding medical decision making.
Then, we present a Decision Space Model to classify the
influences that determine and initiate decision needs and
direct the unfolding decision-making processes. We conclude this introduction by expanding the Decision Space
Model to accommodate the inherent distribution of functions in the context of shared decision making.

Approaches to Understanding Medical
Decision Making
Researchers have examined medical decision making
using both quantitative and qualitative methods. On the
quantitative side, laboratory studies have analyzed how
individuals—mostly medical professionals or students—
process information to make decisions given predefined
decision points and assumed medical solutions/evaluation criteria (e.g., Croskerry, 2009). For example, cognitive science researchers have made extensive comparisons
between the diagnostic accuracy of physicians using simple decision rules that are adapted to answer specific
diagnostic questions and domain-independent normative
statistical models (e.g., Phang, Ravani, Schaefer, Wright,
& McLaughlin, 2015; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). However,
neither heuristic, intuition-based, nor more elaborate
hypothetical-deductive decision models (Custers, 2013;
Schwartz & Elstein, 2009) shed light on how decision
points are identified, how relevant decision-making
parameters are selected, or the definition of appropriate
criteria for a “good” clinical decision.
Quantitative research focused on shared medical decision making typically examines a small number of factors
(e.g., health literacy, diagnosis, intervention programs) in
relation to specific outcomes (e.g., satisfaction with care,
accurate risk assessment, disease status; Ghane, Huynh,
Andrews, Tabuenca, & Sweeny, 2014; Hibbard & Greene,
2013). By contrast, qualitative studies mainly examine the
role of socio-cultural phenomena such as interpersonal
dynamics, discourse, or power relations in decision making (Corbin, 1998; Roter & Hall, 2006), but attend less to
information flow and associated cognitive processes.
We argue that the process focus pertaining to most
quantitative approaches and the impact of socio-cultural
influences on decision making emphasized by most qualitative approaches are complementary. Both are necessary to understand how decision points are identified and
how relevant decision-making parameters are selected
for making “good” clinical decisions. Clinical care
involves parameters that are not well replicated in laboratory settings, and, in fact, contradicts some basic experimental assumptions: In clinical care, decision points and
outcome criteria are not given and situations are uncontrolled and unpredictable, in part, because multiple players influence the decision process (Klein & Wright,
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2016). Clinical decision making is a part of an ongoing
trajectory complicated by fluctuating preferences, contextual constraints, and ambiguous task requirements
(Broadstock & Michie, 2000). These contextual factors
form a socio-cognitive landscape that is as inextricably
linked to decision-making processes and outcomes as
topography is to nautical navigation (Hutchins, 1995).
We argue that when integrated into this socio-cognitive
landscape, (shared) decision-making processes and
related challenges such as misdiagnoses and non-adherence may be better understood (Barber, 2002; Cameron,
Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1993). We begin by identifying
cognitive, physical, and social influences on the decisionmaking process.

The Decision Space Model
We suggest the Decision Space Model in Figure 1 to
specify and classify the physical, psychological, and
social influences that shape individual decision making.
The model was originally developed to describe physicians’ decision making in acute care settings (Feufel,
2009). The lower half of the figure is consistent with constructs in the classical literature on problem solving
(Simon & Newell, 1971). The upper half of the figure is
consistent with classical constructs in social science
(Kleinman, 1980).
The Decision Space Model treats individual cognitive
processes, environmental constraints (state space), and
opportunities for action (action space) as functionally
related but conceptually separable components of a distributed decision-making process. The state space consists
of the properties of the task environment, where states
evolve as a consequence of both human action and natural
processes over time. The model differentiates physical
constraints, such as resources, technology, and probabilistic relationships between symptoms and diseases, as limits
on the range of possible states. In medical settings, such
physical considerations include the patient’s physiological
status and the availability of resources to manipulate a
patient’s status such as biomedical technology and treatment options. Values enable a distinction between desirable states (potential goals) from undesirable states
(potential problems). Values include personal or professional preferences related to culturally defined notions of
health care, illness, and quality of life considerations.
The action space encompasses participants’ ability to
generate desirable and acceptable states (e.g., March &
Olsen, 2006). The range of feasible actions is limited by
personal capacities, such as psychomotor or cognitive
abilities. The range of acceptable action is limited by
adopted norms, socially accepted rules governing action,
including informally defined social roles as well as formalized institutional policies. In medical settings, this
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Figure 1. The decision space for a single actor.

may refer to the practice of limiting diagnostic procedures to the level required to make and justify a treatment
decision (Shalin & Bertram, 1996) or admit or discharge
a patient (Feufel, 2009). In combination with the prevailing state space, adopted norms determine the availability,
selection, and sequencing of justifiable actions.
The Decision Space Model associates the need for
decisions with potential changes in the trajectory for clinical cognition and care. The need for a decision may
result from natural progression along an illness trajectory
or from the identification of undesirable and potentially
remediable current states. Decision makers then select
and combine parameters of the state space with options
from the action space to consider in making the decision.
Finally, evaluation of these options according to a system
of values and norms yields the decision.

Toward an Understanding of Shared Medical
Decision Making
Critically, in medical decision making, individual actors
typically only have partial access to the full state and
action spaces. Physicians and patients are working on the
same problem, but their understandings of the decision
space may differ. In the state space, the physician depends
upon the patient for information about her state of health
(e.g., symptoms and comorbidity) and personal values.
Similarly, the patient depends upon the physician for biomedical information, such as symptom–disease contingencies. In the action space, the physician depends upon
the patient to adhere to treatment, whereas the patient
depends upon the physician for access to treatments that
require medical expertise or authority. In the action space,

norms and personal capacities shape each actor’s contribution to treatment. This inherent interdependence
implies that shared decision making between physician
and patient is a distributed cognitive process comparable
with that between medical professionals (Engeström
et al., 2003; Epstein, 2013; Feufel et al., 2011). Therefore,
decision making must draw on the perspectives of both
physician and patient to result in an effective cooperative
system (Malone & Crowston, 1994).
Below, we support an extended version of the Decision
Space Model to cover shared decision-making processes
involving both physicians and patients (see Figure 2).
Analysis focuses on the identification of patterns of decision making and how they reflect the sharing of the decision-making process in the Decision Space Model.
Discussion concerns ramifications of these findings for
extending conventional, theoretically driven notions of
medical decision making and its practical applications.

Method
This study draws on two data sets focused on physician–
patient interactions, one collected in Emergency
Departments (Feufel, 2009) and the other collected in a
clinic specializing in Multiple Sclerosis (Lippa & Shalin,
2015). Initially separate data analyses revealed findings
that were mutually reinforcing. Preliminary investigation
of the Multiple Sclerosis data focused on the decisionmaking process and yielded four decision patterns, differentiating the particular contributions of physicians and
patients in medical decision making. Preliminary analysis
of the Emergency Department data focused on influences
between environmental factors and medical decisions
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Figure 2. The integration of physician and patient perspectives to a mutually acceptable decision space.

and led to the development of the Decision Space Model.
Because both studies used field observations and interviews for similar conceptual reasons but looked at different forms of medical care, this article uses both data sets
as a means of data triangulation to support the generalizability of results and identifies the common contextual
factors that influence the decision processes presented.
Below, we describe the conceptual perspective for both
studies, the separate processes of data collection and initial analyses, and the common final analysis.

Conceptual Perspective
Both studies originated from a concern for the psychological considerations that inform the design of efficient
work systems and technology. The research was motivated by the belief that design recommendations depend
on understanding how medical decisions are made in
context. Such an understanding requires a combination of
knowledge about medical practice and a broad theoretical
conceptualization of medical decision making. However,
much of the prevailing theory assumed both pre-specified
decision points and evaluation criteria. Accordingly, the
researchers chose to collect data through field observations and interviews to capture physicians’ decision

making in context when interacting with patients, to
ground a theoretical model of medical decision making.

Data Collection
Both studies used participant observation during patient–
physician interactions and conversations with informants
in the field (medical and clerical staff). The researchers
attempted to keep their role as unobtrusive as possible to
minimize influence on the interaction. However, all the
participants were aware of the researcher’s presence and
interest in “reasoning processes,” creating potential for
altering interactions. All consent procedures were
approved by institutional review boards (IRBs) at the
researchers’ home university and the medical facilities
where data were collected.
The Multiple Sclerosis data were collected through a
specialty care center at a large, Midwestern medical
school. Two board-certified neurologists (with 11 and 17
years of experience) and 16 patients (three men and 13
women) participated. Four participants had a high school
level education, seven were college educated, three had a
post-graduate education, and two did not wish to discuss
their educational background. Patients represented a wide
range of experience with Multiple Sclerosis, from newly
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diagnosed to having lived with the disease for decades.
Physician and patient participants provided written consent. Approximately 65 hours were spent making observations. Data collection included audio recording and/or
detailed field notes depending upon the comfort of the
participants. To provide as rich a description as possible,
the examples below are drawn from audio recordings.
Within 14 days of the initial observations, follow-up
interviews were conducted with all patients including
general questions and focused discussion of problems
and decisions from the clinical session. These interviews
facilitated the initial analysis by Lippa and Shalin (2015)
in providing additional contextual information, clarifying
the patient’s intentions during and reaction to the clinical
interaction. The taped clinical sessions and interviews
were transcribed using literary transcription.
The Emergency Department data were gathered in two
teaching hospitals associated with the Medical School of
a mid-size, Midwestern university: a larger urban hospital
and a smaller suburban hospital. The larger urban hospital served a largely uninsured, racially and ethnically
mixed population, with a relatively high proportion of
lower socio-economic status patients. The patient population at the smaller suburban hospital was generally
insured and predominantly Caucasian, with a larger proportion of higher socio-economic status patients. At each
Emergency Department, three attending and six resident
physicians were followed during a work shift (approximately 10 hours) balanced across shifts and days of the
week, summing up to approximately 160 hours of observations. Attending experience ranged from 5 to 31 years,
with a mean of 13.2 years. The resident sample consisted
of two in each of the first, second, and third years of residency. During each shift, the observed physicians saw
between 10 and 28 patients. Given time constraints and to
avoid disrupting care, the IRB approved only asking physicians to provide written consent, whereas patients were
asked for their consent verbally prior to observation. For
the same reason, demographic information could not be
systematically collected from the patients. Conversations
between physicians and patients as well as with the
observer were logged by hand and later transcribed.
Notes captured the semantic content of each conversational turn and reflected the participants’ word choices.

and how it was used, factors affecting the ultimate decision, and roles adopted by physicians and patients.
Connections between the identified concepts revealed
four common patterns of decision making depending on
the distribution of information, action, and cognitive
activities across patient and physician.
The Emergency Department data were initially coded
with respect to environmental cues used for making decisions. The initial conceptual distinctions related to singular cues such as medical history, patient preferences, or
resource availability. Based on discussions with subject
matter experts, these cues were then grouped into two
functionally related categories: cues pointing to problematic features of the situation and cues referring to actionable solutions.1 Selective coding of instances based on
this categorization led to an initial version of the Decision
Space Model as a way to locate the observed influences
on decision making (Feufel, 2009).
Discussions among the authors suggested that the
decision patterns identified in the Multiple Sclerosis
clinic data complemented the Decision Space Model
identified from the Emergency Department data and vice
versa. This prompted the researchers to selectively recode the Emergency Department data based on the decision patterns and re-interpret the Multiple Sclerosis data
in light of the Decision Space Model. Comparative analysis of selected decisions from both data sets and associated discussions by the authors helped to refine the
conceptualization of the Decision Space Model and the
observed decision patterns.

Final Data Analysis
A final analysis focused on close examination of decision
making and discourse in both settings. Individual examples from Multiple Sclerosis management and the
Emergency Department were selected to illustrate the
decision-making patterns identified. They were selected
because they clearly articulated cognitive, discursive,
interpersonal, and environmental characteristics that
were common to decisions of a particular pattern. The
examples are representative in that they include common
processes, but often contain higher than average ambiguity or conflict in the decision parameters prompting direct
articulation of decision-making efforts.

Initial Data Analyses
Data from the Multiple Sclerosis clinic were analyzed
first, based on the principles of grounded theory (Strauss
& Corbin, 2008). Initial, open coding identified decision
making as a core category. All the data involving decisions were microanalyzed for indications of underlying
decision-making processes. This analysis included identifying concepts relating to what information was present

Results
Decision-Making Patterns
In both chronic and acute disease management situations,
physicians and patients had access to different portions of
the decision space. This led to decision patterns that varied from primarily individual to completely distributed.
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Table 1. Patterns of Distributed Medical Decision Making.
Identification of
Decision Point

Definition of
Parameters

Final Decision

Characteristic Situations

Physiciandominated

Physician responsibility Physician responsibility Physician responsibility Decision is highly technical and/or
urgent and requires minimal patient
action
Physician-defined, Either actor may be
Physician responsibility Patient responsibility Decision is predicated on biomedical
patient-made
responsible
information but requires patient
action
Patient-defined,
Either actor may be
Patient responsibility Physician responsibility Decision is dependent upon case
physician-made
responsible
history and/or phenomenological
information but requires physician
action
Patient-dominated Patient responsibility Patient responsibility Patient responsibility Decisions are dependent upon patient
evaluation of the state space and do
not require physician action (i.e.,
self-care, self-medication)

That is, physicians and patients each took responsibility
for some or all stages of the decision process: identification of the need for a decision, elaboration of parameters,
and final choice. The specific roles adopted by patients
and physicians depended upon each participant’s access
to information about the state space and available actions.
Table 1 summarizes the decision-making patterns found
and when they typically occur.
In some cases, physicians and patients each dominated
decisions, taking responsibility for all stages of the decision-making process. Nonetheless, the role of the other
was often at least implicitly considered. In other cases,
the decision tasks were split between the physician and
patient. One actor identified the need for a decision and
established decision-relevant parameters whereas the
other made the final choice. The analysis below examines
each of the decision-making patterns in detail. Parallel
examples from Multiple Sclerosis management and the
Emergency Department are provided for each decision
type as convergent evidence.

Physician-Dominated Decisions
Physician-dominated decisions correspond most closely
to the decision-making context assumed by cognitively
oriented theories related to heuristic decision making
(e.g., Marewski & Gigerenzer, 2012) or hypotheticaldeductive decision making (Schwartz & Elstein, 2009).
Physician-dominated decisions occurred in both settings
when the decision need and process were predicated on
specialized biomedical knowledge of disease states and
the physicians’ action space. Some physician-dominated
decisions were completely unilateral with no provision to
inform or include the patient in the decision. This was
especially true when physicians followed discipline-prescribed normative protocols with no complicating factors

(e.g., patients presenting with chest pain should have an
electrocardiogram [EKG]). However, in some physiciandominated decisions, complicating factors required consideration of the patient’s perspective.
In the management of Multiple Sclerosis, a chronic
condition, decisions made by physicians alone were typically found at the end of the clinical encounter concerning the formulation of a plan for care (Roter & Hall,
2006). As part of this conclusion, physicians frequently
made unilateral decisions about topics that were routine
or highly technical, especially whether and when to send
the patient for testing (i.e., magnetic resonance imaging
[MRIs], bloodwork). The following example illustrates
this process:
Physician: I am just debating. Should we repeat the MRI—
see where you’re at? Or just not do anything and wait? Like
I said, it’s a little bit difficult to proceed. Because if we were
going to know that you can get pregnant in the next two
three months there is no reason to even do the MRI. And
then again if you are going to be trying to get pregnant we’re
not going to start your medication anyway. The only thing
would be like if the MRI were tremendously bad, what I
don’t expect, and then we could consider starting you on
medication, wait? Otherwise, we’re going to try you again to
get pregnant after you go off the medication. That’s the only
thing I am debating right now. But I think that we’ll probably
just wait to see, you know, how it goes.

Here, medical norms within the action space indicate a
routine MRI, but the physician identifies a combination
of physical constraints (medication that is contraindicated
for pregnancy) and values (patient’s goal of becoming
pregnant) that oppose this norm. This conflict prompts
the physician to explore other parameters within the state
space (probability of pregnancy and disease status) and
how they are linked to possible actions (a diagnostic MRI
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and medical intervention). Only after exploring these
parameters does the physician make a final decision.
The exclusivity of the physician’s decision-making
process here is logical. Only she has the technical expertise to evaluate most of the parameters and weigh whether
a test is medically indicated in light of the patient’s values. Although the physician does all the cognitive work in
this case, she shifts from a first person singular construction to a first person plural. Her use of the first person
singular demonstrates that she is in charge of the decision
process (“I am debating”), but she shifts to a plural construction when sampling options from her action space
(“Otherwise we’re going to try you again to get pregnant
when you go off the medication”) thereby including the
patient. This pronoun shift indicates that this physician
considers the decision as part of a trajectory of care that
reflects patient involvement.
In the acute care Emergency Department setting, physician-dominated decisions occurred mainly when
patients required immediate care, when they were incapacitated and their families unavailable, or when subsequent action did not depend on patient preferences.
Nevertheless, Emergency Department physicians often
considered and vocalized at least part of the clinical reasoning behind their decisions to inform patients about
what actions were to be taken and why they were justified. This type of discourse provided the patient/family
with access to information defining the patient’s current
state and associated care alternatives. In response,
patients often voiced preferences for certain options
based on their values, which the physician could then use
to further specify next steps. Consider the following decision about recurrent chest tightness:
Attending: I couldn’t find anything with the tests, your chest
x-ray looks fine, your enzymes are fine and they should
show if you had problems with your heart a couple of hours
ago. But I want to keep you here overnight.
Patient: What do they want to do?
Attending: Probably a stress test [of the patient’s heart].
Patient: Naa . . . I want to go home.
Attending: We should do at least one more blood test. You
can go home after the blood test comes back negative and
after I call the clinic for a follow-up appointment tomorrow.

In this example, the Emergency Department physician
identified the need and relevant parameters (checking for
myocardial infarction, addressing the patient’s previously
articulated concern about hypertension) based on his biomedical knowledge of the state space and the available
resources for action. More important, the physician was

aware that he was accountable for making sure the patient
did not suffer from an acute and severe heart problem.
His professional norms suggested admitting the patient
for observation overnight. To accommodate patient values, he agreed to omit admission, but only if an additional
test came back negative. The decision for another test
was, therefore, under the purview of the physician.
Although the physician made all the decisions in this
instance, by articulating his decision-making process, he
allowed the patient to provide input resulting in a mutually acceptable trajectory for care.
In summary, despite a biomedical rationale for a particular choice, physician-dominated decisions may still
involve and, in some cases, require coordination with
patients’ values. In both acute and chronic disease management, the need to create a common trajectory of care
may necessitate the articulation of the physician’s clinical
cognition and the incorporation of the patient’s
perspective.

Physician-Defined, Patient-Made Decisions
In physician-defined, patient-made decisions, the physician elaborates relevant parameters, and the patient
makes a final selection. Typically, the physician presents
information about a limited set of options, so that the
patient can make an informed choice. This decision pattern appears in the literature on shared decision making
(Elwyn et al., 2012). Decisions of this type often occur
when the physician’s understanding of the physical constraints (e.g., pathophysiology) in the state space and
properties of the potential options in the action space
(e.g., efficacy, side effects) is essential, but the patient
enacts the decision (e.g., taking the medication) and
incurs the majority of consequences (e.g., side effects,
costs). This decision pattern reflects the interaction
between the physician’s privileged access to biomedical
information and the patient’s ability to act.
In Multiple Sclerosis management, decisions that follow this pattern typically involve the selection of a course
of treatment or use of complementary treatments (e.g.,
physical therapy). These decisions are technical, requiring physician knowledge, but involve substantial action
by the patient. The distributed dynamic this creates is
especially clear when the patient’s norms conflict with
the physician’s analysis. For example, the patient in the
dialogue below initially refused conventional treatment
in favor of alternative medicine. What is interesting here
is not merely that the patient contributed to the final decision, but that to resolve the conflict, the physician redefines the decision parameters.
Physician: I remember you saying that you decided not to do and
you were saying that you were thinking more about natural
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medicine. Copaxone® is more like a mixture of amino acids and
so it’s milder than Betaseron®. Betaseron® is like Interferon.
That’s why it’s a strong, little bit more synthetic I would say.
Patient: OK.
Physician: Copaxone® would be more natural. That’s the
reason I was just, I was changing my mind. [ . . . ] So you’re
comfortable with the Copaxone® or you prefer the
Betaseron® medication?
Patient: Um, I read both and the Copaxone® actually
sounded like, in the stuff that I read, sounded like something
I’d rather do because it seemed more simple . . .

The physician begins to set up possible alternative
courses of treatment and implied trade-offs by introducing
a new medication (Copaxone®) and contrasting it with a
medication she previously recommended (Betaseron®).
She represents the chemical structure of the new medication as more compatible with the patient’s norms for
acceptable treatments (preferences for natural medicine)
and presents the patient with an explicit choice of medication. The patient’s selection echoes the physician’s definition of the decision parameters, accepting the medication
as a more “natural” alternative. By refusing a course of
action initially proposed by the physician, the patient
expanded the set of usual decision parameters, requiring
the physician to present a new alternative in a way that
aligns more closely with the patient’s norms. This illustrates the inherent interdependence between the patient’s
action choices and the physician’s clinical reasoning.
The dependence of clinical decision making on patient
choice of action was also apparent in the Emergency
Department. In one example, a 77-year-old patient fell
and felt something “burst” in her head:
Physician: The CAT scan is showing no bleed but it’s not
100% correct; 3-5% of all actual bleeds are not detected
with a cat scan. The only way to be 100% sure is to do a
spinal tap. [ . . . ] If you ask me what I think? Is that caused
by an aneurysm? No. But the lawyers and medical experts
tell me to do it anyway. I can’t prove it 100% in any other
way. I will be honest with you: It’s not easy in a 77-year old
patient. [ . . . ]
Daughter: What else can we do? What else can cause it?
Physician: Many things. [ . . . ] I suggest getting her admitted
for observation and they can consult with neurosurgery if
they think that’s necessary. She is sitting on the fence,
definitely. Do you have anything against keeping her here?
Daughter: It’s up to her [looking at her mother].
Patient: [looking at her daughter]. If you think that is best for
me.

In this example, the Emergency Department physician explained the dynamics of an aneurysm in the
state space and gave recommendations and options for
how to best react. Although the physician considered
legal implications and recommended admission, he
judged the probability of an aneurysm low, which
allowed him to give the patient the final choice whether
to stay in the hospital for further tests. Relative to the
physician-dominated Emergency Department example
presented earlier, this example demonstrates that part
of the physician’s task is to identify which physical
constraints warrant physician-dominated decisions and
which allow for physician-defined, patient-made decisions, which are more reflective of patient norms and
values.
Despite domain differences, these examples from
chronic and acute care illustrate the same pattern of distributed clinical cognition. In each case, the physician
directs the dyad’s attention to specific physical properties
and associated potential actions, essentially mapping possible trajectories of care. The physician then interprets
and discusses the desirability of these trajectories in light
of patient values and norms. The patient uses the information and analysis from the physician to make a final
decision. In these situations, the challenge is turning a
distributed cognitive problem into a shared trajectory for
reasoning about care. The physician’s efficacy depends
on framing decisions in a way that is mindful of the
parameters that correspond to the patient’s norms and
values.

Patient-Defined, Physician-Made Decisions
During patient-defined, physician-made decisions, the
patient guides the trajectory for clinical cognition. Hints
of this pattern appear in the literature concerned with
patients seeking the treatment of pain and infection
(Stivers, 2002). Our analysis suggests that this pattern
can be found more generally when the patient held privileged knowledge of the state space (e.g., phenomenology
of symptoms, case history) and the physician held powers
of action (e.g., write prescriptions or order tests). In these
cases, patients used their knowledge to define the parameters of the decision either generally or as a fixed choice
within a limited set of actions. The physician’s role was to
correlate the range of possible treatment options, biomedical aspects of the state space, and associated decision
parameters outlined by the patient to make a final and
informed choice. In many cases, some or all the options
required action by the physician, at least in the form of a
prescription. This structure places physicians in a gatekeeper role requiring them to make the final decision; a
patient may prefer a particular option and set up a choice
accordingly but cannot enact it without physician
participation.
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In the Multiple Sclerosis clinic, patient-defined decisions typically involved the treatment of symptoms introduced by the patient. This is an area where the patient’s
access to experiential information about symptoms is
critical. Similarly, treating symptoms typically involves
judgments about comfort and functionality rather than
medical necessity, so the patient’s values play a larger
role. The physician’s role is to match the patient-defined
parameters with available medical options and provide
access to those options she deems appropriate. In the
example below, all these elements are at work.
Patient: I had stopped (hydrocodone) at the beginning of that
week unfortunately been a day, a day or two, I went the
hospital. They gave me, he wrote a script for me. Ay, ay, I
took the medicine as soon as could. And sure you know
within 4 hours, or actually within 20 minutes I started to feel
better. Within an hour my quality of life just improved
dramatically . . .
Physician: [Which medication helps you the best? Pain
mediation?
Patient: Hydrocodone, . . . Methadone seemed to work really
well but then when I started to taper off of it. It was, it was
the worst thing that’s ever happened to me.
Physician: What happened?
Patient: Um, my body went into the worst type of shock. Just
withdrawal and shock. Uh, uh, uh. I never want to take
anything that my body becomes that reliant on.
Physician: The last thing you were on, how much did you
take?
Patient: I brought you this. This is what, this is, this is what
I’ve been taking. That’s what I usually take. And it just
depends on what the pain level is. If I can take one, I take
one . . . And like I said the Requip® it didn’t work. It didn’t
even make me sleep and uh the Cymbalta® I just I did not
like the way it made me feel. And it didn’t work for the pain.
For some reason this pain is . . .
Physician: So um yeah. So I wrote down what you respond
to and I will give you some until you get to the pain clinic

This patient had Multiple Sclerosis for a long time and
suffered from chronic neurological pain. He had run out
of the pain medication he usually took and wanted the
physician to give him a new prescription. Therefore, he
used information he had about the state space and knowledge of the physician’s norms to set up decision parameters intended to help the physician decide to provide the
desired treatment. He began by describing his need for
pain treatment as crucial, suggesting the current state
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required immediate action. He then described a negative
withdrawal experience and his corresponding desire to
avoid future dependence by minimizing his use of medication. This addressed the physician’s norms that access
to narcotics should be limited because of issues of abuse.
Finally, he limited the options for treatment, listing several non-narcotic medications that he had tried unsuccessfully. This framed the decision narrowly for the
physician: She could leave the patient in pain until he saw
a pain specialist or prescribe a medication that conflicted
with norms limiting narcotic use. Ultimately, she accepted
the patient’s implicit argument that the need to treat with
a narcotic outweighed the addiction risk.
This interaction reflects the specific information and
action profile that each participant had available and
could contribute to negotiating an acceptable trajectory of
care. The patient provided the experiential and case history information needed to support a decision and the
physician had the authority to act and corresponding
responsibility for judging the advisability of particular
actions.
Similar cases were found in the Emergency Department
when patients came in for acute exacerbations of chronic
or recurrent conditions. Emergency physicians were also
dependent upon the patients to provide critical information about the state space. This process was often complicated by concealed intentions as reflected in, for instance,
exaggerated symptoms (e.g., the “narcotic-seeking”
patient) or minimized symptoms (e.g., patients who did
not acknowledge the intensity of their pain). The following patient-defined, physician-made decision provides a
more subtle illustration of the dependence on patient
framing, conflicting with an implicit, ultimately questionable norm that patient knowledge is not immediately
relevant or needed during acute diagnostic care. A patient
with a complex medical history including anemia presented at the Emergency Department reporting pain in her
back and shoulder. For about two hours, the Emergency
Department staff explored various possible causes including shingles and pulmonary problems. Finally, the patient
indicated that the symptoms felt like she was “anemic
again” and needed a transfusion. This simple framing
altered the physician’s cognitive trajectory surrounding
the case, suspending effort to rule out a set of potentially
complex problems to determining anemia as a sufficient
cause for admission and terminating emergency care
delivery.
In both cases, the decision was split because information about the state space and the ability to act were distributed across actors. In patient-defined, physician-made
decisions, the patient has the information to identify the
need for a decision but cannot or does not know how to
translate this into action, whereas the physician has the
knowledge of the physical constraints that allows her to

10

Qualitative Health Research 

judge the advisability of a given action and societal
authorization to implement it. This distribution of knowledge and action yields a distribution of cognitive processes. Given this pattern, the efficacy of the encounter
depends on the patient’s ability and willingness to share
experienced concerns accurately and the physician’s ability to identify viable and medically justifiable options to
address these concerns.

Patient-Dominated Decisions
Patient-dominated decisions occur when the patient can
act independently of the physician. This pattern appears
in the literature concerning patient adherence (Vermeire,
Hearnshaw, Van Royen, & Denekens, 2001). But as
with patient-dominated, physician-made decisions, our
analysis suggests that the patient-dominated pattern
should be viewed as part of a wider continuum of shared
decision making and must not be limited to the common focus on adherence. Patients independently made
two major types of medical decisions: to seek care and
to discontinue care. Care seeking is rarely considered in
discussions of medical decision making because it
takes place prior to entering the medical system.
However, nearly all the patients in the Emergency
Department and a few of the Multiple Sclerosis patients
deliberately chose to seek care. When Emergency
Department patients decide to go to urgent care, wait
for a clinic appointment, or forego medical attention,
they trade off the risk of missing critical treatment with
the costs in money and time associated with an emergency visit. Similarly, Multiple Sclerosis patients experiencing altered symptoms make judgments about the
urgency of medical needs (requiring care from an
Emergency Department or through a clinical visit) and
the proper provider (a primary care physician, neurologist, or other specialist). Because clinical cognition and
care inherently differ depending on medical specialization, when a patient chooses a provider, they initiate a
specific trajectory for both care and clinical cognition.
Patients do choose to stop acting in a way that has
been previously discussed (e.g., cancel an appointment, discontinue a medication, or delay treatment).
From the perspective of distributed cognition, such
non-adherence reflects a failure to develop a shared
trajectory for clinical reasoning during an inherently
distributed task.
Most patients understand that taking action independently from the physician is considered a violation of cultural norms. As such, these decisions typically entered the
conversation obliquely as reports of past behavior that
influenced the current decision space. For example,
Patient: No, I don’t take Provigil® anymore.

Physician: Oh, just the Ritalin®. How were you feeling
when you were taking both?
Patient: I never took both.
Physician: Oh, I thought that it was in the notes.
Patient: Oh no, no, no. As soon as I started taking—as he put
me on the Ritalin®, I stopped taking Provigil® because I
was scared to take them together.

This decision is presented at the beginning of the dialogue as information to include in the current state space,
rather than at the end as a product of an articulated process of reasoning. After reporting the decision, the patient
works backward to reveal the issues that prompted (and
justified) taking a deliberate action. In the Multiple
Sclerosis clinic, many patient-dominated decisions, as
above, could be classified as non-adherence. But, the
patients were actually engaging in self-care according to
their own analysis of the decision space in the absence of
a shared trajectory for clinical reasoning between patient
and provider.
Given that Emergency Department physicians generally do not follow their patients, there were no similar
cases of patient’s choosing to modify previously agreed
upon treatment regimens. However, physicians were
aware that patients leaving the hospital ultimately made
their own treatment decisions. Discussions surrounding
patients’ decisions ranged from pragmatic (e.g., unhappy
patients may not disclose relevant information or may
require additional attention—“Let’s get people admitted
and clean up triage [ . . . ] I don’t want to have those
people [ . . . ] come back in three hours and we have to
deal with them then.”) to helpful (e.g., providing resources
for patient self-care) to pejorative (e.g., a comment that a
patient would “have to choose between meds and cigs”)
to ethical (e.g., consideration of patient preferences when
deciding to treat, admit, or discharge a patient). In this
sense, the patient’s unique role as the final decision maker
and actor was also part of the context informing decision
making in the Emergency Department.

Limitations
This study is limited by constraints on data collection by
observation as well as the selected settings. Our presence
during data collection was apparent to physicians,
patients, and family members. We view the risk of influence on physicians as minimal due to the critical nature of
their professional responsibilities. We also view the risk
of influence on patients as minimal, due to the critical
nature of the concerns that motivated their quest for medical care. Although the use of two different types of care
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suggests a degree of generalizability, in other medical settings specific aspects of the decision space may influence
the distribution of cognitive processes in ways that are
not anticipated by this study. For instance, the technical
foundations of decisions in an Intensive Care Unit might
alter the way that patients and physicians approach decision making or the feasibility of all patterns.
Given that we used two existing data sets, we were not
able collect data in a motivated fashion to confirm the
developing theory or to verify that data saturation was
achieved. However, the relatively large corpus available
for analysis and the convergence of two data sets suggests
that the data were sufficient to support the findings presented. In retrospect, the observed decision patterns represent a logical spectrum of the distribution of
decision-making responsibility, even if they may not
include all possible variations.
Finally, the focused analysis of decision making
based on the Decision Space Model does not substitute
for a holistic ethnography of medical decision making in
the observed domains of the health care system. That is,
the model offers a way to conceptualize, categorize, and
discuss the influences on decision making, but does not
elucidate the specific socio-cultural and technical processes that create these influences in chronic and acute
care. Future research is needed to explore the meaning
of and role that specific chronic illnesses such as
Multiple Sclerosis, or acute health problems such as
heart attacks or strokes, play in structuring decisionmaking situations.

Conclusion
This study suggests a reconceptualization of medical
decision making in terms of the distributed cognition
paradigm. We began with the Decision Space Model to
clarify the relationship between physical and social influences on decision making. Using concrete instances, we
demonstrated that both patients and physicians consider
these influences when identifying the need for a decision,
searching for relevant decision parameters, making
actionable decisions, and developing satisfactory care
trajectories. Depending on the specific access of patients
and physicians to information and resources for action,
we identified four different patterns of decision making in
both acute and chronic care settings. These patterns form
a continuum of shared decision making, uniting the traditional decision-making researcher’s focus on physicianled decisions and patient participation with the
practitioner’s concern for assessing patients’ needs and
problems of adherence. In other words, these patterns
help to integrate issues raised in different literatures into
a more general framework fusing individual and shared
decision making.
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The physician-dominated decision, prevalent in the
cognitively oriented decision-making literature was only
one of several observed decision patterns. Moreover,
even in these situations, some instances required knowledge, or at least consideration, of the patient’s interpretation of the decision space—their norms, values, and
opportunities to act—for effective and justifiable decisions. Other observed patterns included split-decisions
where one party specified the parameters of the decision
and the other party made a final decision and decisions
that were made only by patients. The consistent theme
across the identified decision patterns is that medical
decisions are predicated on the division of information
and the ability to act. Thus, the participation of both physicians and patients in decision making is not just socially
desirable, as suggested by the shared decision-making
paradigm, but the inevitable result of the distribution of
clinical cognition.
This study yielded three key findings. First, medical
decision making is fundamentally distributed between
physicians and patients; this is true not only in chronic
disease management but also occurs in acute care.
Second, the ways in which actors conceptualize and evaluate physical, personal, and socio-cultural constraints on
the decision space can vary substantially, emphasizing
the need to negotiate problems and solutions and to create
shared trajectories for clinical cognition. Effectively,
each actor’s understanding of the decision space becomes
a constraint on the state space of every other actor. Finally,
the different patterns of shared decision making we identified suggest that in natural environments, decision making is a temporally extended process including the
identification of a decision point, the definition and
assessment of relevant parameters, and the final choice,
which represents but one episode in a care trajectory. The
distribution and organization of these tasks depend on
actors’ understanding of and physically and socially constrained capacity to act within the decision space.
These findings have implications for both theoretically and clinically oriented work. First, the Decision
Space Model unites cognitive-behavioral processes,
physical constraints, and socio-cultural considerations. In
examples from the management of both chronic and acute
care, the interplay of informational, physical, and sociocultural perspectives became evident in nearly every
interaction. Even when physicians were making highly
technical decisions, they accounted for socio-cultural
constraints in addition to purely biomedical and resource
considerations. From a theoretical perspective, this suggests that experimental research on medical cognition,
most of which is phrased in terms of probabilistic biomedical concerns, fails to account for a substantial portion of the decision process. It also suggests a need for
more research into the cognitive processes underlying
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shared decision making and for medical education to
train professionals how to negotiate the interplay of
social, resource, and biomedical considerations.
Second, the Decision Space Model suggests that decision making spans actors’ conceptualization of the environment and their opportunities and requirements for
action. Analysis based on this assumption helped to identify a multi-stage decision process involving the identification of decision points, refinement of decision
parameters, and a final decision. A focus on the division
of available information and action opportunities between
actors underscores the pervasive distribution of cognitive
processes along this temporal trajectory. On a theoretical
level, the observed dynamics between state and action
spaces suggest that decision-making research needs to be
sensitive to more than just final decisions. More research
is needed to understand how the relationship between
state and action space triggers the need for a decision and
defines the parameters to be considered during the final
decision.
Finally, the expanded Decision Space Model incorporates contributions from multiple actors. When information, cognition, and action are distributed, actors must
inform one another about relevant influences (including
implicit norms and values) and clearly communicate
decision parameters to allow for common ground (e.g.,
Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) and coherent decisions.
This finding highlights the core contributions patients
make to clinical cognition, including patterns of decision
making that are patient led, which have typically been
overlooked or dismissed as “non-adherence.” Unless
physicians and patients transform the distributed task into
a shared cognitive trajectory, physicians may misdiagnose symptoms or patients may be unable (or unwilling)
to comply with prescribed treatments. Thus, on a clinical
level, medical staff should be trained and patients should
be asked to communicate their understanding of state and
action space so that mismatches can be identified early.
Our findings further suggest that studying patients’ reasoning processes—including prior to entering the health
care system—is important to better understand the extent
to which decisions are necessarily shared and that limiting research to medical decision making in the doctor’s
office risks reinforcing a limited paternalistic model.
In summary, the results suggest a need for both extension and integration of current models of medical decision making. First, a better understanding of shared
decision making will require consideration of the role of
distributed medical, physical, and social factors in physicians’ and patients’ reasoning. It also will require an
extended focus on processes related to the identification
of decision needs and the search for decision parameters,
in addition to those involved in the final decision. Second,
the identified decision-making patterns unite researchers’
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and clinicians’ concerns with a common underlying
framework of distributed medical decision making. By
expanding the Decision Space Model with the observed
patterns of distributed cognition, the future research
agenda is substantially clarified: The four dimensions of
the decision space pose different specific possibilities of
individual and shared responsibility for decision making
to investigate.
From an applied perspective, the interdependence of
physician and patient cognition suggests that a goal for
improving clinical decisions should not only be to instruct
physicians to engage intentionally in shared decision
making, that is, a change in attitudes. Training should
rather focus on helping physicians and patients understand and improve upon the ways they already adapt their
cognition to accommodate the division of information
and resources for action. This way both parties may be
empowered to better coordinate information, cognition,
and action and thereby improve the quality of care, adherence, and treatment outcomes.
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Note
1.

The validity of these categories was independently supported by a statistical factor analysis of another data set
collected in this setting, which found an equivalent distinction—cues related to goal establishment and goal enactment—to describe physician information seeking behavior
(Robinson 2011).
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